

Excerpt of a  
**SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**VERMONT  
STATE CAPITOL**

**MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY  
MANTECH SYSTEMS ASSURANCE COMPANY  
6400 Goldsboro Road  
Bethesda, Maryland 20817**

## Vermont State Capitol Building

Upon the specific request of the Chief of Capitol Police, the team undertook a cursory assessment of the interior spaces of the Vermont State Capitol building. It should be noted that under specific legislative guidelines, the Commissioner of Buildings and General Services is responsible for the security of the exterior of the capitol building while the Capitol Police (CP) and the Sargeant-at-Arms are responsible for the interior of the building and the members of the legislature.

The prime concern of security at the state house is the delicate balance between preservation of the historic attributes and openness of the People's House, while protecting the structure and its occupants in face of today's threat environment. Obviously this is no easy task. It has been the trend of all parties to weigh openness over security to date.

In assessing the Capitol and surrounding grounds, the following main items surfaced:

- Policy and procedural issues
- Perimeter controls
- Increased Capitol Police presence
- Remote monitoring

*It should be noted that many of these issues were previously noted by the Capitol Police Dept. and that the department already has initiatives underway to address these concerns.*

### Policy and Procedural Issues

- 1) Expand the authority and jurisdiction of the Capitol Police Department to cover the "Capitol grounds" as well as portions of the parking areas servicing the capitol, Pavilion and Supreme Court buildings.

As noted above, Capitol Police jurisdiction is currently limited to the building itself and the immediate perimeter. In order to allow for maximum efficiency in the control of the facility, jurisdictional authority for the Capitol Police should be extended to cover the grounds and parking areas servicing the Capitol. This will allow the police to project their sphere of control further out and interdict potential threats before they arrive at the facility.

Further study is recommended into the merits of expanding Capitol Police jurisdiction the cover the Joint Finance building. It would also be fruitful to examine the possibility of further expanding jurisdiction to cover the travel of senior house members when making official public appearances while the legislature is in session.

- 2) Revise the current memorandum of understanding between the Department of Buildings and General Services and the Capitol Police Department periodically.

Certain elements of communication between BGS and the CP, such as notification of public events taking place on the capitol grounds, are fluid in nature. The exigencies of both departments are likely to change of the course of time and in response to current events. In that light, a memorandum of understanding between the tow departments should be drafted and periodically updated to cover requirements not currently cover by legislative writ. For example, extension of the CP jurisdiction could be permitted under this arrangement until such time as it can be formally legislated. Similarly, budgetary items concerning the security of the exterior of the facility can be coordinate between the departments.

- 3) Policies pertaining to access granted to vendors and maintenance personnel (other than State employees) need to reviewed and updated.

Current access granted to vendors and contracted maintenance personnel is virtually unlimited and largely unsupervised. There also is no formal system of background checks or vetting for such personnel having routine access to the facility. It is recommended that the State Capitol be included in any future badging and access control system being contemplated by the State as recommended elsewhere in the Physical Security Assessment Report.

At present, a substantial renovation effort is underway at the State Capitol. Large-scale construction is taking place in various areas of the Capitol building. Electrical lines, telecommunications services and a host of other critical support functions are being affected. There is no system of supervision of contractors or vetting of background and credentials of those vendors servicing these critical systems. It is recommended that such a system be established, even if rudimentary in form, to prevent unauthorized tampering or vandalizing of critical systems.

- 4) Visitor access protocols need to be established and a visitor control system put in place.

Currently, visitors to the Capitol are virtually unrestricted in access to the facility. Any of the exterior doors can be used to permit visitor access. It is recommended that visitors be directed to singe visitor's entrance equipped with some form of reception desk. While it may not be feasible to issue visitor "passes" to each guest, at best rough numbers can be tracked so as to limit and control the number guests in the building at any one time.

Also, areas appropriate for visitor access should be clearly marked. Adequate barriers to visitor access in unauthorized areas should be put in place.

## Perimeter Controls

- 1) Serious thought should be given to the re-establishment of perimeter fencing surrounding the Capitol grounds.

Here again, one must weigh the security benefits of a perimeter fence against the degree of openness desired. The Mantech team strongly encourages a dialogue on the merits of erecting a perimeter fence around the Capitol grounds.

The current lawn of the Capitol serves much like public park, where citizens enjoy the natural surroundings as well as the right to congregate. The State's other parks are equipped with perimeter fencing and uniformly close at dark. In this sense, the lawn of the Capitol can be treated equally. Perimeter fencing provides a natural barrier to unauthorized access, particularly after dark, and allows the Capitol Police the chance exert access control to grounds when needed.

Obviously, perimeter fencing need not be made of unaesthetic materials, but can easily be fashioned in keeping with the historical and architectural grandeur of the Capitol.

*N.B. This is an area already under consideration by the Capitol Police and Sargeant-at-Arms.*

- 2) At least one perimeter entrance with a "guard house" should be constructed and equipped with a magnetometer and x-ray screening device.

In conjunction with the argument for adding a perimeter control system, at least one future perimeter access point should have a guardhouse or visitor reception center structure. This would serve to afford shelter to entrants in process during inclement weather as well provide a single entry point during special circumstances.

The CP has noted that even with the central mail screening system in place in Middlesex, a very small percentage of the inbound packages and pieces of mail at the State House are subject to screening. With that in mind, the guardhouse should be equipped with a magnetometer and an x-ray device to permit screening of packages, mail, personal belongings and individuals entering the Capitol. Clearly such a system would not need to operate continuously, but could be put in place when the legislature in session or during other special occasions.

### Increased Capitol Police Presence

- 1) Increase the number of Capitol Police officers and consider expanding duty hours.

Currently, the CP consists of one officer, augmented by local and State police officers when necessary. CP presence is limited to hours of operation, or whenever members are present. The CP should be significantly expanded, to allow for at least two officers on duty and an on-call officer. The hours of coverage should be expanded to 24-hour coverage during legislative sessions and other special occasions.

### Remote Monitoring

- 1) A CCTV system should be considered to cover entries and parking areas.

While technological solutions are not always best, a remote monitoring system would greatly add to the security posture of the Capitol. A system using closed circuit television (CCTV) with camera coverage of each entry as well as each parking area is sorely needed. Having such a system in place allows the CP to monitor those areas while still maintaining a physical presence in other critical areas of the building. Also, after hours monitoring will be greatly enhanced.

Implementation of such a system can readily be done with no impact on the architectural integrity of the building.